

科目：管理論文評論【企管系甲組】

本試卷共有兩大部分，考生只選其中之一部份作答，考試成績也以該部份的考生做相對性的計算。第一部份為管理相關研究論述，第二部份則為與醫療、健康、照顧產業等相關問題。考生請依自己專長擇一作答。

第一部份：隨著企業與經濟的發展，管理教育一直是許多學者關心的焦點，以下四段文字是最近一些論述的摘錄。試閱讀完畢後請用中文回答問題。

(一) The traditional paradigm of business schools, with its strong focus on analytical models and reductionism, is not well suited to handle the ambiguity and high rate of change facing many industries today. Business educators have always faced the dilemma of academic rigor pitted against practical relevance (notwithstanding Kurt Lewin's astute observation that nothing is as practical as good theory). The dilemma stems from two seemingly conflicting notions. On one hand, universities must hold true to the time-honored tradition of scholarship and the associated principles of scientific inquiry. On the other hand, whatever universities teach and explore within their professional schools must be relevant to the clinical art that defines that profession at the time. Unlike such professions as law, medicine, engineering, or architecture, business has yet to develop a unifying professional identity or a standard for professional certification (which the MBA presently is not).

The need to balance the competing demands of rigor and relevance was scrutinized in a provocative 2005 *Harvard Business Review* article by Bennis and O'Toole as well as by Mintzberg in his 2004 book *Managers, not MBAs*.¹ Both works are highly critical of the dominant MBA focus on analytic and cognitive skills, stylized treatment of real business problems, self-centered careerism, and the limited recognition that management is as much a clinical art as a science. Other provocative perspectives on the challenges facing business schools were offered in a point-counterpoint section of the *Journal of Management Studies* (December 2004 issue).² Pfeffer and Fong highlight there that MBA programs have become big business driven by a market orientation to education in the

absence of a unifying professional ethos. Starkey et al. contend that business schools have become morally bankrupt by pushing growth for its own sake through satellite programs and executive education, while instilling business values—such as winning at all costs and personal enrichment—that helped fuel the greed and corporate scandals of the 1990s (with Enron as its poster child). The latest criticism comes from Rakesh Khurana at the Harvard Business School whose well-researched book *From Higher Aims to Hired Hands* reviews over 100 years of business education. He argues that business schools have strayed from their lofty aim of educating far-sighted, moral business leaders to producing myopic, career technocrats.³

Some will argue that the explosive growth of MBA programs over the past several decades constitutes strong evidence that the current business school model is actually working very well. They may also note that many entrepreneurs and executives hold MBAs (as does President George W. Bush). How much credit MBA training deserves—relative to the USA being a magnet for global talent, the existence of top flight venture capital markets, technological innovations by engineers and scientists, or a social and legal climate conducive to business—is hard to untangle. For example, there was great innovation in the USA prior to the ascent of the MBA degree, and many of today's entrepreneurs obtained other types of degrees or dropped out of college altogether. MBA critics will emphasize that business schools have lost much market share to corporate universities, experience stiff competition from other non-academic sources, helped indirectly fuel greed and corporate scandals, and saturated the market with "me to" business degrees. They might also point to declining U.S. dominance in business research and teaching globally as evidence that the traditional U.S. business school model is past its prime and in need of renewal.⁴

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(二)

The history of business education reveals an elusive balance between business and society. In the early fifties, business education was more akin to vocational training than to science. Some schools of commerce featured courses on basic bookkeeping or best baking practices in their core curriculum. In 1959, they were justly criticized by reports from both the Carnegie Foundation and the Ford Foundation for lacking rigor and scholarly merit.⁵ Moving beyond just critique, these powerful foundations offered competitive grants to reinvent business education and imbue it with greater rigor and scholarly depth. Four centers of excellence were eventually funded (at Carnegie-Mellon, Harvard, MIT, and the University of Chicago), with economics identified as a common core academic discipline. Ever since, the field has beefed up its academic standing by promoting faculty with deep scientific roots. Over time, however, these scholars often took business research in directions no longer comprehensible or relevant to business students and managers.

As the field moved toward more analytical approaches, borrowing from the physical sciences as well as statistics and computer science, academic respectability increased while practical relevance often took a back seat. This, it was argued, would be the price of progress as scholars should not be handmaidens of narrowly focused executives or meddling school administrators. Carnegie-Mellon, MIT, Stanford, and the University of Chicago epitomized this more rigorous approach with occasionally striking results. For example, finance scholars raised profound questions about the optimal dividend policy and the capital structure of firms, as well as the pricing of risk in efficient markets, which resulted in major advances in both theory and practice. Multiple Nobel prizes in economics have been awarded to faculty whose primary appointments were in a business school rather than in an economics department.⁶

The highly mathematical models underlying such leading research tend to focus more on well-defined problems rather than the messy ambiguities of the real world. Heavily influenced by the academic discipline of economics, which often suffered from physics envy, business scholars were preoccupied with equilibrium solutions and optimality theorems in which analytic elegance could truly shine. In 1980, this reductionist approach was much criticized in a celebrated *Harvard Business Review* article by Hayes and Abernathy as underlying America's economic decline relative to Japan and West Germany at that time.⁷ They cited *managerial failure* as the root cause, rather than myriad other factors such as excessive government regulation and taxation, labor unions, high oil prices (OPEC), short-term focus in financial markets, or new technologies. The culprit, they felt, was an over-utilization of analytical techniques that shifted the focus from long-run technological development and strategy to portfolio management, financial control, operations management, and short-term optimization. Others concurred, criticizing the over-reliance on static economic models while paying insufficient attention to the dynamic nature of business, the crucial role of knowledge, the internal structure of the firm, the seminal role of entrepreneurship, and a focus on stylized markets rather than social networks.⁸

Although America has since regained much of its economic might, the world of business has become even more dynamic, uncertain, and multicultural. Driven by technological innovation, globalization, geopolitical turmoil, concerns about climate change, and ideological schisms, the notion of equilibrium seems a quaint artifact from a simpler time. As a consequence, the shift that started in the 1960s, coupled with some striking features of the new global knowledge-based economy, compels us to rethink our approach to business education and research, as well as perhaps the very nature of the university and the role of professional schools therein. Universities no longer have a monopoly on higher learning. When Google declares its mission as "organizing the world's knowledge," as corporate "universities" spring up, when consulting firms become think tanks in their own right, and the Internet permits remote learning, a new era is upon us. Business schools may become just one of many knowledge hubs. To remain relevant they must clearly articulate their comparative advantage in

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light of the changing challenges businesses face now and will likely face in the future.

(三)

Throughout the 20th century, university-level business schools in North America were forums for argument over the appropriate character of management education, how to think about the structures and programs of such education, and what kind of schools such thinking suggests. The conflict extended to questions of staffing, organization, curriculum, and research programs. It shows no signs of abating at the start of the 21st century.

Persistently through the history, two contending exaggerations have framed the debates. The first proclaims that management education has sacrificed relevance to the esoterics of academic purity. The second bemoans the subordination of fundamental knowledge and research to the limited perspectives of immediate problems. These proclamations may often have been overly dramatic, but they have reflected an enduring dispute in professional schools that is manifest also in the histories of schools of medicine, engineering, law, education, and public policy and administration.¹

Practical Experience and Scholarship

All of these schools exhibit tensions between "experiential" knowledge and "academic" knowledge.² Experiential knowledge is derived from practical experience in the field. It is stored in the wisdom of experienced practitioners and is communicated by them. Its hallmark is direct and immediate relevance to practice. Academic knowledge is derived from scholarship. It is stored in the theories of academics and is communicated by them. Its hallmarks are an aesthetic of ideas and abstraction from practice.

The dichotomy oversimplifies the relationship. Experiential knowledge and academic knowledge are in many ways better seen as intertwined than as in opposition. Experience is interpreted within frames that reflect academic sensibilities, and the research on which academic knowledge is based is deeply affected by the observations and understandings of experience. However, at least from the time when Aristotle undertook to teach Alexander the Great, concerns about the relation between the knowledge gained from experience by skilled practitioners, on the one hand, and the knowledge gained from scholarship by skilled academics, on the other, has shaped the formal training of practitioners. Knowledge derived from practical experience tends to emphasize immediacy and applicability in a specific context. It is ordinarily more focused in time and space than is academic scholarship. Conversely, the academic perspective tends to emphasize the timelessness and generality of its relevance. As a general rule, the longer the time horizon and the broader the scope, the greater the comparative advantage of academic knowledge.

(四)

The history of business schools in North America and Europe has been explored by a number of scholars.¹¹ From the present point of view, they tell a fairly consistent story. During the first half of the 20th century, business schools worked to be useful to students seeking careers within the business community. As an early study of business education put it:

"The primary aim of the university school of commerce is to prepare its students for successful and socially useful careers in business."¹²

The research scholarship component of academic life was, for the most part, not a conspicuous part of business schools. Some business schools had doctoral programs, but those programs contributed relatively little to the training of research scholars. Some business schools had research programs, but the research was rarely viewed as distinguished or fundamental within the scholarly community. Business schools hired experienced executives as professors and tried to replicate experience through the teaching of cases, the involvement of faculty in consulting, and the linking of course work with temporary employment of students in business firms. They sought to become the carriers of "best practice."¹³

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The effort to be useful to business was, to a significant extent, successful. The success was achieved, however, at a cost. It left North American business schools (all of the important ones, which were formally associated with universities) with only modest legitimacy in academe. Even the Harvard Business School, probably the best known North American business school prior to the Second World War, was not always enthusiastically embraced by Harvard disciplinary departments.

Reasonable people differ on the extent to which the inconsequential standing of business schools in the halls of academe reflected accurate assessments of their academic performance or stemmed from envy of business school affluence; but there was little question that North American business schools suffered from reputations for mediocre academic capabilities.¹⁴ Although the data did not always consistently support the stereotype, students enrolled in business curricula were generally viewed as weaker than students enrolled in most other curricula. Although there were outstanding scholars on business school faculties, faculty in business schools were generally viewed as less distinguished academically than other faculty.¹⁵ Herbert Simon, whose training was exclusively in academic disciplines but who held an appointment in a business school, reflected on the standing of business schools in his autobiography:

"Accurately or not, we perceived American business education at that time [i.e., immediately after the Second World War] as a wasteland of vocationalism that needed to be transformed into science-based professionalism, as medicine and engineering had been transformed a generation or two earlier."¹⁶

Although a careful documentation of the extent and nature of the changes has not, to our knowledge, been published, it is widely believed and reported that management education experienced a change of some magnitude during the 1950s and 1960s. According to the reports of observers, most North American business schools were transformed by coalitions of deans, faculties, foundations, and business executives who sought to augment the role of academic knowledge in the education of managers.¹⁷ They searched for programs of research that might lead to improvements in practice, not so much through diffusion of "best practice" as through changes in fundamental knowledge. They emphasized knowledge generated through research, closer links with the disciplines, more rigor, including the greater use of mathematical models and the research findings of psychology and economics, and the substitution of formal analysis for rules of thumb.

1. 請摘要每段文字的大意（內容越精要越好，每段最多不得超過 200 字） 60 %
2. 何謂 experiential knowledge？何謂 academic knowledge？試依您所熟悉的具體管理知識為例說明之。 20%
3. 第二段文字和第四段文字都討論到美國的管理教育，試比較其異同。您能因此想到台灣管理教育所面臨的問題嗎？ 20%

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第二部份：請將下列的英文摘要以中文100字（含）以內方式摘要寫出。並說明這裡面的依變項 (dependent variable) 為何？

OBJECTIVE: To compare the costs of physician-owned cardiac, orthopedic, and surgical single specialty hospitals with those of full-service hospital competitors.

DATA SOURCES: The primary data sources are the Medicare Cost Reports for 1998-2004 and hospital inpatient discharge data for three of the states where single specialty hospitals are most prevalent, Texas, California, and Arizona. The latter were obtained from the Texas Department of State Health Services, the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development, and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project. Additional data comes from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey Database.

STUDY DESIGN: We identified all physician-owned cardiac, orthopedic, and surgical specialty hospitals in these three states as well as all full-service acute care hospitals serving the same market areas, defined using Dartmouth Hospital Referral Regions. We estimated a hospital cost function using stochastic frontier regression analysis, and generated hospital specific inefficiency measures. Application of t-tests of significance compared the inefficiency measures of specialty hospitals with those of full-service hospitals to make general comparisons between these classes of hospitals.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Results do not provide evidence that specialty hospitals are more efficient than the full-service hospitals with whom they compete. In particular, orthopedic and surgical specialty hospitals appear to have significantly higher levels of cost inefficiency. Cardiac hospitals, however, do not appear to be different from competitors in this respect.

CONCLUSIONS: Policymakers should not embrace the assumption that physician-owned specialty hospitals produce patient care more efficiently than their full-service hospital competitors.